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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PlAintiff-Appellant, 
T~E I;QUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, EITEL McCULLOUGH, INC., 
and SECOND INJURY FUND, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Supreme Court No. 19337 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case is an appeal from an order of the Industrial 
Conimission denying plaintiff's Motion For Review and affirm-
ing the Find in gs of Fact, Cone lus ions of Law and Order of 
the administrative law judge. 
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
The administrative law judge ruled that the plaintiff 
wa.s 110t entitled to permanent total workers compensation 
''""cfit.s from the defendant Second Injury Fund for the 
reason that he had "no other alternative or option b"t t· 
dismiss the claim for permanent total disability a,; b~i 11 ., 
barred by the Statute of Limitations as contained in :oecuo~ 
35-1-99, Utah Code .1\nnotated." 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the Order m;,de b/ t 1e 
administrative law judge and affirmed by the Industrial 
commission. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff filed a "Petition For Consideration of '.'erma-
nent Total Disability and Re-imbursement of M·2:1ical 
Expenses" in December 1982. The matter was set for· hearing 
on April 27, 1983. At the hearing the administrative Liw 
judge refused to allow plaintiff to offer any evidence, to 
testify in her behalf and refused plaintiff's counsel the 
opportunity to argue substantial issues of law by oral argu-
ment or post-hearing briefs. (R. 175-180). Plaintiff wa3 
totally denied any opportunity to present evidence or oti1er-
wise in her bwn behalf. 
The Findings of Fact, 
issued by the administrative 
Conclusions of Law and Order 
law judge on the 10th day oi 
May 1983 was wholly unsupported by any viable evidence 
any kind (R. 182-186). The purported hearing consisted of 
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paqes of transcript of the proceedings which was a recita-
t10n by the judge of documents appearing in the file. 
The findings referred to (R. 182) as a preface to the 
.·J-c.11 l,~d Findings of Fact the administrative law judge 
,,oted, "At the outset of the hearing, after a review of the 
file, the Administrative Law Judge found that the Peti-
tion ... should be denied. The reasons for the same will be 
s2t forth more fully hereinafter." (Underscoring added.) 
The administrative law judge used as Findings of Fact 
his review of the records in the file of the commission--
picking and choosing the records that supported his 
position. 
With reference to the facts surrounding the original 
proceedings in this matter from 1961 to the present time the 
administrative law judge has correctly surrunarized this from 
the records of the commission (R. 182, 183). Plaintiff sus-
tained an injury by accident on October 31, 1961, received 
tern:Jorary total compensation benefits until September 1963. 
0n or about October 14, 1963 the Applicant filed an Applica-
tion for Physical Examination by the Medical Advisory Board 
(!{. 25.) (Underscoring added) which was the predecessor of 
the present Disability Rating Panel. The Chairman of the 
'>Jrnmiss ion advised the Applicant that she would receive bene-
fit·> com,nc·ncing September 1963. On or about May 4, 1964 
1:1 cough counsel a "Petition For Rehearing" was filed. By 
l ·tter of May 7, 1964 the Chairman, Otto Wiesley, advised 
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"We will accept your Petition For Re-Hearing as an apJ2.li_c_,_ 
tion for a formal hearinq." CR. 40) (Underscoring acJcle-11 
A hearing was held on September 13' 1965. 
then referred to a special mediccil panel. ~.n P.pplicati 
For Additional Compensation and/or Medical Benefits 
filed on May 10, 1965. CR. 74). A report of the panel "-1: 
received, objected to by the plain ti ff and a further he.Hin, 
held on June 6, 1966. On August 3, 1966 an Order of the 
commission issued signed by all three commissioners IP. 
136). 
On July 6, 1970 the plaintiff filed a form Applic-.;tion 
For Heaz:ing, pro se, requesting additional compensatin·! 
based upon continued pain and further surgery in 1969 P. 
144). The response from the Heaz:ing Examiner was that the 
wrong form was filed. CR. 145). In 1972 in answer to a t~le· 
phone inquiry the same response was made by another hearing 
examiner--wrong forms and no supporting medical evidenc2. 
In July 1975 a treating physician advised the commissio1 
that "Her disa:)ility rating is totally disabled as it ilos 
already been rated and will be on a permanent basis." IR. 
156). 
ARGUMENT. 
POINT I. 
DO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES OF TllE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION HAVE AUTHORITY TO ISSUE 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE RECORD ONLY 
AND DENY PLAINTIFF A HEARING OR OPPORTUNITY 
TO BE HEARD? 
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The record as summarized by the administrative law 
1·1qe and plaintiff are not in substantial disagreement. 
H0'.""ver, the plaintiff believes the administrative law judge 
c:xCPccdcd his authority in charactei::izing this summary as 
"Findings of Fact" based upon a hearing which was never 
tv?ld, testimony produced or arguments of law presented. 
The administrative law judge's exact statement appears 
·~ith the file in its present posture, the 
administrative law judge has no other alternative 
or option but to dismiss the claim for permanent 
total disability as being barred by the statute of 
limitations as contained in section 35-1-99 Utah 
Code Annotated, and also that section has been 
interpreted and permanent total disability indi-
cated by the Utah Supreme Court and that Beverly 
R. Buxton case." CR. 78). 
In the body of the decision prior to the purported find-
ings in the judge's opinion appears the following: 
"At the outset of the hearing, after a review 
o E the file, the Admin is tra ti ve Law Judge found 
that the Petition For Consideration of Permanent 
Total Disability and Re-imbursement of Medical 
Exoenses should be denied. The reasons for the 
sa~e will be set forth more fully hereinafter." 
The judge, before the hearing, made an ex-parte determi-
'''°'ti. 1i to deny the claim without benefit of one word of 
0 ,t1mony or the offering of any evidence by any party to 
ihr::- proceeding. In fact the administrative law judge not 
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only refused testimony but refused to allow proffers of ~"i­
dence or arguments by counsel against his pre-con~~i 
interpretation of supreme Court decisi0n. 
As counsel for plaintiff I was allowed to make , 
sentencP statement to clarify the dissertation of the ju•l]c 
(R. 179). The response of the judge was: 
"The Court: Well, I 
you can argue your brief 
For Review, since it is a 
179). 
will enter my order an'.) 
in the form of a Motion 
legal issue anyway." IR. 
The authority and jurisdiction of administrative law 
judges is found in Section 35-1-82. 52 Utah Code Ann. igsJ. 
This section provides i1 part: 
"35-1-8 2. 5 2. Hear in gs may be held before the 
commission sitting as administrative law judges or 
any administrative law judge of the commis-
sion ... The commission shall appoint one or more 
administrative law judges and the commission or 
any administrative law judges shall have power and 
authority to call, preside at, and conduct hear-
ings, including the power to issue subpoenas .... A 
full and complete record of all proceedings before 
the co~mission or administrative law judge and all 
testimony shall be ta%en down by a reporter 
e .. 1ployed by the Commission ... Upon the conclusion 
of -a hearing the administrative law judge or the 
commission, as the case may be, shall make find-
ings of fact which shall include all evidential 
and ultimate facts necessary to support his 
order ... Such findings of fact and order of the 
administrative law judge or commission shall be in 
writing and copies thereof shall be furnished to 
each of the parties in interest." 
The jurisdiction of the commission and the administn· 
tive law judges is to conduct hearings, prepare findinys 
fact and orders based upon testimony or evidence adducd .it 
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a hearing. In the instant case there is no viable evidence 
bc'[Or•, the administrative law judge or the commission. 
TIF r~ is no "evidence" to support any findings of the admin-
1 ,1:r1tive law judge let alone the commission. The "record" 
,~ans is ts of documents, forms, letters, applications, orders, 
(etc.) in the file. These were selected by the administra-
tive law judge as facts upon which his findings were based. 
In effect the administrative law judge and the commis-
sion lby its denial of the Motion For Review) have taken 
upon themselves the power and authority of a court of gen-
eral jurisdiction in granting Motions For Summary Judgment. 
Tn the instant case the administrative law judge exceeded 
this authority by refusing counsel the opportunity to be 
section 35-1-82.51 Utah Code Annotated provides for the 
question of the nature of a hearing: 
section 35-1-82.51--Hearings shall be held by 
the commission upon reasonable notice to be given 
to each inLerested party, by service upon him 
peroonally or by mailing a copy to him at his last 
known post-office address ... All parties in 
interest shall have the right to be present at any 
hearing, in person or by attorney or by any other 
agent, and to present such testimony as may be 
pertinent to the controversy before the commission 
~J!d shall have the right to cross examine." 
(Underscoring added.) 
This court has stated in Baker v. Industrial Commis-
~i•m 17 U(2d) 141, 405 P2d 613: 
"As a matter of law the industrial commission 
rn:iy not, without any reason or cause, arbitrarily 
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or capriciously refuse to believe and act upon sub-
stantial, competent and credible evidence, which 
is uncontradicted." 
The corollary of the foregoing would nlso be true, [,'1.l 
the commission cannot arbitrarily and capriciously act Ul'lJn 
no evidence. (Underscoring added.) 
In James v. Ogden Auto Body ( 1982), 646 P2d 703 t:,,, 
court stated: 
"Industrial commission may adopt the findings 
of an administrative law judge without holding a 
hearing and making further findings; such proce-
dure does not violate due process of l;,w." 
The only basis for the foregoing decision is that the 
plaintiff in that case had a "hearing" before the ad min istro-
tive law judge. Due process has thus been met. The Supreme 
Court then held that an addition a 1 hearing before the comrnis-
sion is not necessary. Plaintiff agrees to this. PlJ in-
tiff's concern is that she has been denied due process on 
having an opportunity to present her case as far back " 
1970. In 1970 and 1972 the decision was administrative--the 
wren-; form or not properly supported by medic al ev iclence 
(etc. l. In truth this case should have been set in 197C 
when her first request was made. 
At the present time a date, time and place for the hear-
ing was set but no hearing resulted where plaintiff co11lJ 
testify, introduce evidence in her own behalf and suiiJPr' 
herself to cross-examination by the defendants. 
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The industrial commission in allowing the above proce-
JJ1 to stand perverts the total purpose of workers compensa-
Permitting the administrative law judges and the 
·"""'''co.>ion itself to have greater jurisdiction than even a 
c,·,,a·t of gen•,ral jurisdiction would do substantial damage to 
th<:o integrity of the system. In place of making the admin-
i3Lr~tive procedures simpler and more direct the tendency is 
cc:i 11,a(:.c, pleading and practice more conplex and difficult. 
i,·ha~- was once a fairly simple procedure--in many cases a 
wo1·ker could handle his own claim--has now become a tech-
nical lejal jungle so complex that it is virtually fatal for 
5omeone to appear without counsel. 
In the instant case the presence of counsel was insuf-
ficient to prevent an arbitrary and unwarranted denial of 
due process. 
Plaintiff therefore respectfully urges that the Find-
ings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of the administra-
·~be law judge and concurred in by the industrial commission 
i ~ ·mid a;id of no effect as being a denial of an opportunity 
fvr plaintiff to present properly her claim for considera-
tion by the said industrial commission. 
POINT II. 
DID THE PLAINTIFF COMPLY WITH THE 
PROVISIONS OF SECTION 35-1-99 UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED BY FILING A CLAIM 
WITHIN THREE YEARS OF LAST 
RECEIVING COMPENSATION BENEFITS? 
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section 35-1-99 Utah Code Annotated provides in part: 
• ... If no claim for compensation is filed with 
the industrial commission within three years ftorn 
the date of the ace id en t or the date of the lds t 
payment of compensation, the right to compensation 
is wholly barred." 
At this stage it is important to review the vario1is 
dates and filings by the plaintiff. The plaintiff ~s 
injured on October 31, 1961. She received compensation bene-
fits until September 1963. Her first application was filoj 
on October 14, 1963. On this date the plaintiff filed a 
document entitled Application For Physical Examination bj' 
the Medical Advisory Board. This filing occurred wit1in 
thirty days of last receiving compensation. Counsel for t1e 
plaintiff having acted as a Hearing Examiner at that time 
was well aware that the commission's policy was that '.:he 
m3.1<:ing of any kind of a "claim" indicating what was wantej 
and reciting the employer's name and requesting any kind of 
a benefit was sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the 
commission. 
This position was confirmed by this court in the case 
of Utah State Insurance Fund v. Dutson (1982): 
"While this section and 35-1-100 require 
either the filing of a claim for compensation or 
the filing of a written notice of the accident in 
order to invoke the jurisdiction of the industrial 
commission, the claim need not bear any particular 
formality and is sufficient if it gives notice to 
the parties and to the commission of the material 
facts on which the right asserted is to depend and 
against whom claim is made." 
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This actually amounts to a restatement of the earlier 
licy of the commission as well as an extension of Rezaldo 
v. fncl_,___Cornm. 161 U412, 213 Pl083. There the court said: 
"While application for compensation is not 
r2quired to be formal as is the case with a 
complaint, yet it should at least contain suffi-
cient information to apprise the commission and 
rhe employer that the employee making it was 
injured in the course of his employment at a 
certain time and place, and that he makes applica-
tion for compensation ... " 
See also Palle v. Industrial Commission 79 U47, 7 P2d 
284, bl ALR 1222. 
Tn further recitation of facts supporting the timeli-
ness of filing a claim, the court's attention is directed to 
Lhe formal Petition for Rehearing filed by counsel on May 7, 
1964. The response from the chairman of the commission was, 
"We will accept your Petition For Rehearing as an applica-
tion for a formal hearing." (R. 40) (Underscoring added.) 
The above is clearly an application for hearing and 
acknowledged as such by the commission. The administrative 
law judge appears to be confused about the above "applica-
t ion for hearing" as not being a claim for compensation. In 
the early days this was .the only way in which a claim for 
co1npensation could be made--a worker applied for a hearing. 
On May 10, 1965 the plaintiff filed an Application For 
;i,LJirional Medical and/or compensation Benefits. (R. 74) 
A formal order of the Commission thereafter issued 
~i,Jned by all three commission members on August 3, 1966. 
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(R. 136). Immediately upon the issuance of this Order the 
jurisdiction of the commission was absolute. 
section 35-1-78 Utah Code Annotated provides: 
"The powers and jurisdiction of the commis-
sion over each case shall be continuing, and it 
may from time to time make such modification or 
change with respect to former findings, or orders 
with respect thereto, as in its op in ion may be 
justified, provided, however, that records pertain-
ing to cases, other than those of total permanent 
disability or where a claim has been filed as in 
35-1-99, which have been closed and inactive for 
a period of ten years, may be destroyed at the 
discretion of the commission." (Underscoring 
added.) 
It must be remembered in this case that (1) three 
claims were filed with ir three years of the last payment ,Jf 
compensation and ( 2) more than ten years had elapsed with-
out the file being destroyed. It is rather apparent the 
commission has never treated this as a dead file or des-
troyed it. 
Not to be stopped in her pursuit of the claim the plain-
tiff, pro se, filed again on July 6, 1970 on the comrnis-
sion's forms claiming a1ditional compensation and medical. 
The commission advised that "it was the wrong form" and no 
hearing was set. 
A further inquiry was made in 19 7 2 for compensation 
with the same response--wrong forms and no supportinq 
medical evidence. 
-12-
In 1975 supporting medical evidence was filed showing 
'cvt,cnsiv'" deterioration of her condition and still no hear-
Fv,~nt,1ally the request for hearing was made by the 
, c1rr'!nt retition on file and to which claim a hearing was 
The administrative law judge takes the approach that 
the claim for disability filed in 1970 was not timely since 
it was nine years from the accident. Inferentially at 
least, it appears that the judge is saying that somehow the 
claim for permanent total must be filed within eight years. 
Such is not the case. The eight year statute of limitations 
deals with temporary total and permanent partial only. 
Se>ction 35-1-66. 
Therefore it is respectfully submitted that the plain-
tiff has timely filed on several occasions the necessary 
applications or claims for compensation to invoke the juris-
diction of the commission and once invoked that jurisdiction 
is 2ontinuous without end. Plaintiff was also the benefi-
ciary of a formal Order of the commission and therefore her 
claim was protected under the continuing jurisdiction of 
Scccti0'1 35-1-78. 
POINT III. 
IS THERE A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN CLAIMS 
FOR PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY COMPENSATION 
UNDER SECTION 35-1-67 AND THE INTERPRETATION 
OF THE BUXTON DECISION? 
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The administrative law judge correctly staterl. 111 ,_ 
background and facts in the case of Beverly R. D1ixtr)n 
Industrial Commission of Utah ( 1978) 587 P2d 171, 
hereinafter ref erred to as Buxton. The sequence of event' 
in Buxton closely parallels the facts and events in the 
instant case almost to the same year. 
In Buxton the accident was in 1966--in plaintif'.'s 
case the accident was 1961. 
In Buxton claimant filed for and was referred to a 
medical panel in 1971 (the first filing). Plaintiff applied 
for a Disability Rating Board in 1963--30 days after tempo-
rary total stopped. 
In Buxton the panel found a 55% loss of bodily 
function and an Order issued in 1971. Plaintiff was found 
to have a 20% loss of bodily function and after a fon1al 
hearing a final Order issued in 1966. 
In Buxton the Application For Additional Compensation 
was filed in 1975. Plaintiff filed an Application for 
Additional Compensation in 1965 on the Commission's forms. 
( R. 7 4) • Because of a pending hearing the matter was merged 
in to that previously set hearing resulting in the Order o[ 
1966. 
Plaintiff filed an additional Application For Hearing 
in 1970. The case was not set because "the wrong form ""' 
used. n In 1972 after a telephone inquiry plaintiff was 
-14-
advised that no hearing would be set without supporting 
Supporting medical evidence was supplied 
i~ 1975. IR. 1471 
In Buxton a hearing was held in 1975. Plaintiff was 
(I.en i ei a hearing based on the 19 7 0 application and again in 
1972. 
Tn plaintiff's case, after the filing in 1982, the 
m•tter was set for hearing but no hearing was held. The 
administrative law judge announced his decision denying the 
claim, then refused plaintiff the opportunity to be heard. 
'1'he interpretation of the administrative law judge is 
not in keeping with what this court actually said in 
Buxton. 
The thrust of the interpretation of the judge is 
limited to the following language: 
"The only limitations of actions statute ~, 
which has application to permanent total disabil-
ity claims is Section 9 9, of the Act, and the 
Commission makes no assertion that the subject 
claim was not filed within three years after the 
elate of injury or last payment of compensation as 
Section 99, requires. <Emphasis supplied.) 
Applying the foregoing to the facts of the 
instant matter, the Application for Permanent 
Total Disability Benefits should have been filed 
no later than December 1967, which would have been 
three years from the last payment of compensation 
or it should have been filed within three years 
from the date of the accident, which would have 
L''c:>n October 31, 1964. Obviously the later date 
is the one to be utilized and even giving the 
Applicant the benefit of the doubt with regard to 
the July 6, 1970 filing, it is clear that that 
filing was three years too late for the purpose of 
111aintaining a claim of permanent total disability. 
Accordingly in view of the Beverly Buxton deci-
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sion and the specific language of Section 35-1-99, 
the claim for permanent total disability should be 
dismissed." (R. 185) 
The administrative law judge apparently does not under· 
stand the facts in the Buxton case. The industrial cornrnis-
sion denied Buxton because the Application For PernMne,
1
t 
Total Dis ability occurred nine years after the ace ident 
asserting section 66 as the basis. This court reversecl the 
Commission saying: 
"The only limitations of actions statute 
which has application to permanent total disabil-
ity claims is Section 99 of the Act and the Commis-
sion makes no assertion that the subject claim was 
not filed within three years after the date of the 
injury or las·c payment of compensation as Section 
99 requires." Buxton v. Ind. Comm .. (Supra) 
Applying the administrative law judge's interpretation 
to Buxton the Application for Permanent Total benefits 
should have been filed within three years of the accident--
1966, or 1974--8 years from the time of the accident. 
The issue that the Supreme Court seemed to point out in 
Buxton was that no claim for compensation was filed with 
the commission between 1966 and 1971--the period during 
which Buxton was suffering from non-industrial problems. It 
is rather apparent that she did not draw compensation during 
this period. Had she done so, Buxton would have received 
over 312 Weeks of compensation. Her permanent partial award 
alone was over 125 Weeks. It would appear that the court 
found no evidence of a claim for compensation during that 4 
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year rer iod. This issue was never raised by the commission 
nnr asserted as a defense. 
The second area in which the administrative law judge 
,erred was the restricted interpretation of an "application" 
or "claim." He has the notion that the claim must be speci-
fically for the benefit requested, i.e. temporary total, 
permanent partial, permanent total and I assume even death. 
The sole purpose of section 99 of the act is to invoke 
the jurisdiction of the industrial commission over the 
claim. That is why the commission, in the past, as well as 
this court, have said anything in writing sufficient to iden-
tify the claim, the parties and the date of the accident 
with some information as to what is wanted, is all that is 
necessary to invoke the jurisdiction of the commission over 
the case. 
It is for this very reason that the exception is made 
on the destruction of records after 10 years. Section 
35-1-78 Utah Code Anno. provides in part: " ... that records 
pertaining to cases, other than those of total permanent dis-
ability or where a claim has been filed as in 35-1-99 •.•.• 
may be destroyed ... " (Emphasis added.) 
For many years the commission has been advising workers 
to file a "Claim For Protection of Rights." On the form 
itself appears the language, "This Claim to Protect Rights 
has been filed with the Industrial Commission in accordance 
with Section 35-1-99, Utah Code Annotated 1953." On the 
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form no request is made for any particular benef i t--merel Y 
to protect the right of the worker to reopen in the future. 
In the record we have several filings with th" 
commission: (1) October 14, 1963, Application For PhysicaJ 
Examinati ,n by the Medical Advisory Board (R. 28); ( 2) May 
4, 1964, Petition For Re-Hearing (R. 36); (3) May 7, 1964, 
acceptance of the foregoing as an application for formal 
hearing (R. 40); ( 4) May 10, 1965 Application For 
Additional Compensation and/or Medical Benefits (R. 74); 
(5) August 6, 1966, Order (R. 136); (6) July 6, 1970, 
Application For Hearing (R. 144); (7) December 17, 1982, 
Petition For Consideration of Permanent Total Disability Md 
Re-imbursement of Medical Expenses. 
All of the foregoing were timely with regard to Section 
35-1-99 and Section 35-1-78. It is difficult to believe 
what else could be done on the part of the plaintiff to 
obtain some kind of a hearing. 
Plaintiff refers back again to the powers of the comrnis-
sion under Section 35-1-78 of the Act. This court said in 
the Buxton (supra) decision: 
"The Commission's jurisdiction to act on 
an application for modification of a previous 
order derives from Section 78 of the Act. 
That section empowers the Commission to make 
such modification of former findings and 
orders as 'in its opinion may be justified.' 
The section has been previously construed to 
require, as the basis of modification, evi-
dence of some significant or new development 
in the claimant's injury or proof of the pre-
vious award' s inadequacy. Kennecott Copper 
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Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 
15 8, 4 2 7 p 2d 9 5 2 .. " 
By virtue of the denial by the administrative law judge 
of a hearing, an opportunity to introduce evidence, a 
refusal to accept medical reports, and denial of the plain-
tiff to even testify prevented the plaintiff from establish-
ing a claim under Section 78. In Buxton <supra) the 
commission had the foresight to allow the claimant to put on 
her case and establish a record before denying the claim. 
Plaintiff was not given such a right. Due process as 
well as the discretionary powers dictate that in all events 
no matter how faulty or defective any claim might be, the 
injured worker at least is entitled to be heard. 
CONCLUSIONS 
A careful review of the record before the court is all 
that is possible under these circumstances. Since no hear-
ing was held no real evidence is before the court. However, 
it is respectfully submitted that the plaintiff has complied 
with all appropriate statutes and court decision for the 
Industrial Commission to have jurisdiction over this matter 
and the commission should be advised that they have no 
authority to issue an Order against a worker without first 
giving him an opportunity to be heard. 
-19-
DATED this ~~~day of April 1984. 
ROBERT J. SHAUGHNESSY, 
Attorney for Plaintiff-
Appellant 
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